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Abstract
The present study investigated the influences of two different forms of reward presentation in modulating cognitive control. In 
three experiments, participants performed a flanker task for which one-third of trials were precued for a chance of obtaining 
a reward (reward trials). In Experiment 1, a reward was provided if participants made the correct response on reward trials, 
but a penalty was given if they made an incorrect response on these trials. The anticipation of this performance-contingent 
reward increased response speed and reduced the flanker effect, but had little influence on the sequential modulation of the 
flanker effect after incompatible trials. In Experiment 2, participants obtained a reward randomly on two-thirds of the pre-
cued reward trials and were given a penalty on the remaining one-third, regardless of their performance. The anticipation 
of this non-contingent reward had little influence on the overall response speed or flanker effect, but reduced the sequential 
modulation of the flanker effect after incompatible trials. Experiment 3 also used performance non-contingent rewards, but 
participants were randomly penalized more often than they were rewarded; non-contingent penalty had little influence on the 
sequential modulation of the flanker effect. None of the three experiments showed a reliable influence of the actual acquisition 
of rewards on task performance. These results indicate anticipatory effects of performance-contingent and non-contingent 
rewards on cognitive control with little evidence of aftereffects.
Introduction
In complex operational environments such as driving a car 
in a heavy traffic or operating an aircraft in air turbulence, 
momentary distraction of attention can lead to a fatal acci-
dent. In such situations, cognitive control needs to be exer-
cised to protect task operations from an intrusion of task-
irrelevant information. A recent neurocognitive theory of 
cognitive control postulates two modes of cognitive control, 
proactive and reactive (Braver, 2012; Cohen, Botvinick, & 
Carter, 2000). This dual-process theory proposes that proac-
tive control operates according to a specific goal of the task 
at hand; it prepares for expected changes in the environment 
according to the past experiences and the knowledge about 
relevant events by varying the emphases of different goals 
involved in the task as necessary. For example, the drivers 
become more cautious about potential hazards on a busy 
traffic that poses a higher risk of collision; such a precaution-
ary state depends on proactive control that strengthens the 
goal of driving safely over other goals, such as reaching a 
destination faster. Reactive control enables a rapid response 
to sudden, unexpected changes in the environment, and it 
adjusts cognitive processes momentarily to adapt to the situ-
ation. For instance, drivers may react to a sudden appear-
ance of a pedestrian running across a road by interrupting 
ongoing activities (pushing the gas pedal) and switching to 
an appropriate action (pushing the brake pedal); such rapid 
changes in the course of ongoing actions depend on reactive 
control.
Proactive control is characterized by sustained and antici-
patory activation within the lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), 
and reactive control is associated with transient activation 
of the PFC and other regions, such as the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC; e.g., Braver, Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 2009; 
Cohen et al., 2000). The ACC is thought to act as a con-
flict monitoring system that detects conflict in cognitive 
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processes and sends a signal to the PFC to adjust control 
(Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001), but it 
is also involved in a range of other processes, such as sen-
sation, emotion, memory, and attention (see, e.g., Wager 
et al., 2016). Importantly, studies have also noted a role 
of the ACC in reward-related decision making (e.g., Bush 
et al., 2002; Hadland, Rushworth, Gaffan, & Passingham, 
2003; Takenouchi et al., 1999). Consistent with this find-
ing, a number of studies have demonstrated links between 
reward-related events and these cognitive control operations 
(Braem, Verguts, Roggeman, & Notebaert, 2012; Fröber & 
Dreisbach, 2014, 2016; Hefer & Dreisbach, 2017; Locke & 
Braver, 2008; van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2009, 
2012), but the results of these studies are not entirely con-
sistent. In particular, some of those studies used the flanker 
task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) and yielded contradictory 
outcomes of rewards on task performance (Braem et al., 
2012; van Steenbergen et al., 2009; see also Dreisbach & 
Fischer, 2012). The present study addressed this discrepancy 
between studies using the flanker task, focusing particularly 
on the roles of anticipation and aftereffect of rewards in 
modulating cognitive control processes when rewards are 
contingent on task performance and when they are not.
Influences of rewards on cognitive control
A number of recent studies have reported effects of reward 
on cognitive performance. For instance, rewards can 
increase response speed (Capa, Bouquet, Dreher, & Dufour, 
2013; Kleinsorge & Rinkenauer, 2012; Umemoto & Hol-
royd, 2015). In addition, monetary incentives have shown to 
enhance perceptual discrimination (Engelmann, Damaraju, 
Padmala, & Pessoa, 2009), short-term memory (Jimura, 
Locke, & Braver, 2010), inhibitory control in antisaccade 
tasks (Chung et al., 2011; Geier, Terwilliger, Teslovich, 
Velanova, & Luna, 2010; Padmanabhan, Geier, Ordaz, 
Teslovich, & Luna, 2011), and the efficiency of switching 
between different tasks (Braem et al., 2012; Jiang & Xu, 
2014; Nieuwenhuis & Monsell, 2002). Rewards can also 
influence cognitive control. Previous studies used the AX-
continuous performance task (AX-CPT), a cue–probe task 
that distinguishes proactive and reactive control, and pro-
vided consistent results that monetary incentives increase 
proactive control (Fröber & Dreisbach, 2014, 2016; Hefer 
& Dreisbach, 2017; Locke & Braver, 2008). Others used 
the flanker task and showed that rewards affected sequential 
modulations of the flanker effect, which have been consid-
ered to reflect reactive control within the dual-process theory 
(Botvinick et al., 2001), but the directions of the influences 
differed between studies (Braem et al., 2012; van Steenber-
gen et al., 2009).
In the flanker task, participants are presented with a 
set of visual stimuli (e.g., color patches) and respond to a 
target while ignoring adjacent stimuli, or flankers. Flank-
ers can be identical with the target on some trials (com-
patible trials) or different from the target on other trials 
(incompatible trials). Responses are typically faster on 
compatible trials than on incompatible trials, yielding the 
flanker effect. A robust finding in the flanker task is that 
the flanker effect depends on compatibility on the preced-
ing trial, such that the effect is smaller on trials that follow 
an incompatible trial than on trials that follow a compat-
ible trial (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992; Mayr, Awh, 
& Laurey, 2003; Torres-Quesada, Milliken, Lupiáñez, 
& Funes, 2014; also see Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 2004; 
Stürmer et al., 2002, for similar findings in other tasks).
There are multiple mechanisms that appear responsible 
for this sequential modulation of the flanker effect. The 
dual-process theory explains this sequential modulation in 
terms of reactive control (Botvinick et al., 2001). Accord-
ing to this explanation, conflict experienced on a previous 
incompatible trial is registered by the ACC as an aversive 
signal, and this signal is sent to the PFC that increases cog-
nitive control to resolve the conflict. Due to the increased 
cognitive control after a conflict trial, the compatibility 
effect decreases on the next trial. Consequently, the dual-
process theorists have termed this phenomenon conflict 
adaptation effect. However, other researchers have sug-
gested that the sequential modulation is due to priming of 
stimulus attributes that are presented on preceding trials 
(e.g., Hommel et al., 2004; Mayr et al., 2003). They have 
shown that responses are faster when all stimulus attrib-
utes on the preceding trial repeat (complete repetition) or 
all switch (complete alternation) than when some attrib-
utes repeat and others switch (partial alternation). This 
account does not assume resolution of conflict as a source 
of the sequential modulation.
In a typical flanker task, the conflict adaptation account 
and the priming account predict the same pattern of the 
flanker effects, and it appears that both mechanisms con-
tribute to the sequential modulation (Egner, 2007). Fur-
thermore, recent studies have suggested that a number 
of other mechanisms may also be involved (see Duthoo, 
Abrahamese, Braem, Boehler, & Notebaert, 2014). Thus, 
the issue of what mechanisms are responsible for the 
sequential modulation has been exceedingly complex, so 
the present study does not attempt to disentangle all of 
these possible accounts of the sequential modulation. Nev-
ertheless, it is still possible to ask an empirical question 
of whether a certain task parameter influences the sequen-
tial modulation, apart from the underlying mechanisms 
that one may assume. Some studies reported that rewards 
reduced this sequential modulation of the flanker effect 
(van Steenbergen et al., 2009; van Steenbergen, Band, & 
Hommel, 2010), but others showed that rewards increased 
the sequential modulation (Braem et al., 2012; Stürmer, 
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Nigbur, Schacht, & Sommer, 2011). To date, this discrep-
ancy has not been addressed sufficiently.
There are a number of methodological differences 
between the studies that have shown the opposing effects of 
rewards on the sequential modulation of the flanker effect. 
One of the most salient differences is the way reward was 
provided to participants. When reward increased the sequen-
tial modulation (Braem et al., 2012; Stürmer et al., 2011), 
rewards were contingent on task performance and rewards 
were given when participants responded correctly or within 
a certain time window. This performance-contingent reward 
gives participants an incentive to perform the task better, 
which would increase the efficiency of proactive control 
operations in the PFC (Strang & Pollak, 2014). When reward 
reduced the sequential modulation (van Steenbergen et al., 
2009), rewards were provided in a subset of trials that were 
chosen randomly, regardless of task performance. Such ran-
dom rewards give no incentive to perform the task better, 
but they could influence the moods of the performer (van 
Steenbergen et al., 2010) or by serving as affective valence 
cues that influence a transient affective state (van Steenber-
gen, Band, Hommel, Rombouts, & Nieuwenhuis, 2015). 
Influences of performance-contingent and non-contingent 
rewards have been compared in the AX-CPT as well (Fröber 
& Dreisbach, 2014, 2016; also see Dreisbach & Fischer, 
2012), which suggested that non-contingent rewards could 
increase reactive control sometimes but not always; thus, the 
results were not clear-cut in this respect. Therefore, although 
the previous studies have shown influences of rewards on 
cognitive control, they remain unclear as to how rewards 
do so. More data are needed to resolve the mixed findings.
The present study
The present study investigated the influences of perfor-
mance-contingent and non-contingent rewards on cognitive 
control in the flanker task. We focused on clarifying how 
rewards would affect the behavioral indices of cognitive 
control, such as response speed, the flanker effect, and its 
sequential modulation in three experiments. These experi-
ments distinguished the contributions of anticipation and 
aftereffect of reward by examining the influences of rewards 
on two different types of trials. In the first type of trials, par-
ticipants were precued at the beginning of a trial on which 
they had a chance to obtain a reward. Because participants 
only expected to receive a reward but had not received it yet 
when they performed that trial, any effects of a reward would 
reflect anticipation of a potential reward. In the second type 
of trials, participants had just received a reward (or lost a 
reward) on the preceding trial. Because no precue was pro-
vided on that trial, participants would not have expected a 
reward when they performed the trial. Any effect of a reward 
on these trials reflected an aftereffect of obtaining a reward.
In all of the three experiments, participants responded 
to color targets that were accompanied by two flankers. A 
reward was presented on one-third of the trials, and these 
reward trials were precued by a visual stimulus (a drawing 
of a treasure box; see Fig. 1). The anticipatory effect of a 
reward was examined in terms of the flanker effect on the 
precued reward trials as compared to the flanker effect on 
nonreward trials that did not present any precue. The afteref-
fect of a reward was examined in terms of the flanker effect 
on nonreward trials that followed a reward trial, as com-
pared to the flanker effect on nonreward trials that followed a 
 nonreward trial. All three experiments used the same flanker 
task, but with different forms of reward presentation.
In Experiment 1, rewards were contingent on partici-
pants’ performance, such that participants gained a point 
(that represented the amount of a monetary reward given at 
the end of the session) if responses were correct, but they 
lost a point if responses were incorrect. In Experiment 2, 
rewards were independent of participants’ performance, but 
were randomly presented. Participants gained a point in two-
thirds of the reward trials and lost a point in the remaining 
third. Experiment 3 was the same as Experiment 2, but the 
proportions of gains and losses were reversed; participants 
gained a point only in one-third of the reward trials and lost 
a point in the remaining two-third. The manipulations of 
the proportions of gains and losses would show the role of 
anticipating positive or negative outcomes. The results of 
the three experiments revealed differential contributions 
of anticipation and aftereffect of performance-contingent 
and non-contingent rewards in modulating cognitive con-
trol. Note that the present experiments intermixed reward 
and nonreward trials within the same block of trials, which 
addressed temporal fluctuations of cognitive control by 
rewards, as opposed to sustained effects that would require 
Fig. 1  Event sequence on nonreward and reward trials
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manipulations of rewards/penalties in separate blocks (e.g., 
Locke & Braver, 2008).
Experiment 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to examine the roles of antici-
pation and aftereffect of rewards in modulating the flanker 
effect and its sequential modulation when rewards depended 
on performance outcomes. Participants performed the 
flanker task in which they responded to the colors of target 
stimuli while ignoring the flankers whose colors were either 
identical with or different from the target color. On one-third 
of the trials, participants earned points if they made correct 
responses, and lost points if they made incorrect responses. 
Monetary rewards were given at the end of the session 
according to the accumulated points. In a similar task set-
ting (Braem et al., 2012), the sequential modulation of the 
flanker effect by the preceding compatibility was found to 
increase on trials that followed a reward, as compared to tri-
als that followed no reward. A similar effect of performance-
contingent reward was also obtained in a different but similar 
task setting, namely, the Simon task, in which the sequential 
modulation of the Simon effect increased when good perfor-
mance was rewarded as opposed to when poor performance 
was punished (Stürmer et al., 2011). However, these studies 
did not assess differential roles of anticipation and aftereffect 
of rewards. The present study extended these investigations 
by examining the role of anticipating a reward on the flanker 
effect by presenting a precue that signaled a forthcoming 
reward trial, as well as that of acquiring a reward on the 
preceding trial.
From the view of the dual-process theory (Braver, 2012; 
Cohen et al., 2000), performance-contingent rewards would 
serve as incentive cues that increase the efficiency of proac-
tive control. Stronger proactive control would be exercised 
when a reward trial was precued, as compared to when it was 
not (i.e., nonreward trial). No study has examined whether 
anticipation of reward alone is sufficient or the actual acqui-
sition of reward is necessary to influence the sequential mod-
ulation of the flanker effect. If the anticipation is sufficient, 
the flanker effect should be modulated by compatibility on 
the preceding trial more on reward trials than on nonreward 
trials. If the acquisition is necessary, the flanker effect would 
be affected by the preceding compatibility more when the 
preceding trial was a reward trial than when it was a nonre-
ward trial. As we mentioned earlier, these predictions do not 
concern any specific mechanisms that may be responsible for 
the sequential modulation.
Participants
Forty eight participants were recruited from the Edge Hill 
University community (32 females; mean age = 20.44, 
SD = 3.69) who received experimental credits toward their 
psychology module or were paid £6 for participation. They 
also received additional monetary rewards, which ranged 
from £1 to £3, depending on their task performance. All 
participants reported having normal or corrected-to-normal 
visual acuity, normal color vision, and normal hearing. The 
experimental protocol was approved by the Research Eth-
ics Committee of the Psychology Department at Edge Hill 
University. Power analyses indicated that the current sample 
size would provide a statistical power of at least 0.99, assum-
ing a medium effect size1 and correlation coefficient of 0.8 
between within-subject measures.
Apparatus and stimuli
The apparatus consisted of a 23-inch widescreen computer 
monitor and a personal computer. The experiment was con-
trolled by E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tool, Pitts-
burgh, PA). Stimuli were filled squares (2.6 cm in sides) 
colored in green or red, which were presented against a light 
grey background. The fixation mark was a plus sign (“+”) 
printed in the 60-pt Arial font in black. The reward cue was 
a picture of a treasure box (see Fig. 1), and feedback on a 
reward trial was either a treasure box filled with a mountain 
of gold coins along with a fanfare sound or an empty treas-
ure box with a buzz sound. There was no auditory stimu-
lus along with a reward cue. Responses were registered by 
pressing two keys (f and j) on a standard desktop QWERTY 
keyboard.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted individually under normal 
fluorescent lighting. Participants were seated in front of the 
computer monitor, wore headphones, and read instructions 
on the screen. They first performed 16 practice trials that 
consisted only of nonreward trials. Participants were then 
informed that some trials would be reward trials on which 
they could gain a point if they responded to stimuli cor-
rectly, but could lose a point if they made an error. Partici-
pants were also told that they would be paid extra monetary 
rewards according to the total point they earned during 
1 van Steenbergen et  al. (2009) had reported a Cohen’s d of 0.49 
(medium effect size) for the effect of reward on the sequential modu-
lation. Although Braem et al. (2012) and Stürmer et al. (2011) did not 
report effect sizes, the range of their sample was 21–44 participants.
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the session. After the instructions, participants were given 
another block of 20 practice trials that consisted of 6 reward 
trials and 14 nonreward trials, followed by four blocks of 152 
test trials each (50 reward trials and 102 nonreward trials). 
The first and last trials of each block were always nonreward 
trials, and the first trial was excluded from the analysis. No 
repetition of reward trials was allowed; nonreward trials 
could repeat no more than three times in row.
The event sequences for reward and nonreward trials are 
depicted in Fig. 1. Each nonreward trial started with the 
fixation cross at the centre of screen for 500 ms, followed 
by a horizontal array of three filled squares. The square in 
the middle was the target to which participants responded, 
and the two adjacent squares were flankers to be ignored. 
The flankers were always in the same color. On a compatible 
trial, the target color was the same as the flanker color. On 
an incompatible trial, the target color was different from the 
flanker color. Compatible and incompatible trials occurred 
in an equal probability, and the target color was chosen from 
the two colors randomly on each trial. Participants had to 
respond within 1500 ms after the target onset. If the response 
was correct, a 1000-ms blank screen replaced the stimuli. 
If the response was incorrect or if there was no response 
within the response window, the screen was blanked for 
1000 ms and a low pitch tone (400 Hz, 500 ms) was pre-
sented through the headphones within this period. There was 
a 500-ms blank display before the next trial started.
A reward trial was essentially the same as nonreward tri-
als, but there was a reward cue before the fixation cross was 
presented. The reward cue stayed on the screen for 750 ms 
and was followed by the fixation cross. The target and flank-
ers were presented in the same manner as on nonreward 
trials. If the response was correct, a fanfare sound was pre-
sented for 1000 ms along with the message “+ 1” and a pic-
ture of the treasure box filled with gold coins. If the response 
was an error, a buzz sound was presented for 1000 ms along 
with the message “− 1” and a picture of an empty box. A 
500-ms blank display appeared before the next trial.
Response time (RT) and accuracy were recorded on each 
trial. RT was the interval between target onset and a depres-
sion of a response key. Responses were recorded as errors if 
a wrong key was pressed.
Results
Mean RT for correct responses and percentage of error trials 
were computed for each trial. Trials were discarded if RT 
was less than 150 ms or there were no response (0.28% of all 
trials) or if trials followed by an error response (2.39%). RT 
and PE were analyzed in two ways, one that examined the 
role of anticipation of reward and the other that examined 
the role of aftereffect. RT is shown in Fig. 2, and PE is sum-
marized in Table 1.
The role of reward anticipation
To examine the role of anticipating a reward, RT and PE 
were computed for nonreward trials and reward trials, both 
followed a nonreward trial. Nonreward trials that followed 
a reward trial were not included in the present analysis. RT 
and PE were then submitted to 2 (Trial Type: reward vs. 
nonreward) × 2 (Previous Compatibility: after compatible vs. 
after incompatible) × 2 (Current Compatibility: compatible 
vs. incompatible) ANOVAs. All factors were within-subject 
variables. The results are summarized in Table 2.
Fig. 2  Mean response times (RT) as a function of Previous Compat-
ibility (after compatible vs. after incompatible) and Current Compat-
ibility (compatible vs. incompatible) in Experiment 1. A The role of 
anticipation, B The role of reward aftereffect
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For RT (see Fig. 2A), as indicated by the significant 
main effect of Previous Compatibility, responses were 
faster after compatible trials (M = 472  ms) than after 
incompatible trials (M = 481  ms) in general. In addi-
tion, the significant main effect of Current Compatibility 
indicated that responses were faster for compatible trials 
(M = 466 ms) than for incompatible trials (M = 487 ms), 
yielding 21 ms of the flanker effect. The flanker effect also 
depended on Previous Compatibility; the effect was larger 
after compatible trials (M = 31 ms) than after incompat-
ible trials (M = 11 ms). Importantly, the significant main 
effect of Trial Type showed that responses were faster 
when a reward trial was cued (M = 470 ms) than when 
it was not (M = 483 ms), and its interaction with Current 
Compatibility indicated that the flanker effect was smaller 
when a reward trial was cued (M = 15 ms) than when it was 
not (M = 28 ms). These outcomes suggested that an antici-
pation of rewards facilitated response speed and reduced 
the flanker effect.
For PE, the significant main effect of Current Compat-
ibility indicated the flanker effect of 0.88%. Although only 
marginal statistically, the effect tended to be larger after 
compatible trials (M = 1.33%) than after incompatible tri-
als (M = 0.43%). No other effects were significant.
Table 1  Percentages of error trials in Experiments 1–3 (the values in 
the parentheses represent one standard error of the means)
Compatible Incompat-
ible
Experiment 1
 Nonreward 
precue
After compatible 1.08 (0.28) 2.79 (0.47)
After incompatible 2.06 (0.39) 2.83 (0.53)
 Reward precue After compatible 1.41 (0.24) 2.37 (0.40)
After incompatible 1.73 (0.38) 1.82 (0.35)
 After nonreward After compatible 1.08 (0.28) 2.79 (0.47)
After incompatible 2.06 (0.39) 2.83 (0.53)
 After reward After compatible 1.66 (0.31) 1.83 (0.32)
After incompatible 2.30 (0.39) 2.56 (0.45)
Experiment 2
 Nonreward 
precue
After compatible 2.44 (0.39) 7.67 (1.00)
After incompatible 7.68 (1.00) 3.78 (0.51)
 Reward precue After compatible 7.85 (2.10) 10.39 (1.52)
After incompatible 9.40 (1.48) 9.17 (2.06)
 After nonreward After compatible 2.62 (0.64) 7.54 (1.06)
After incompatible 6.90 (0.92) 3.13 (0.55)
 After gain After compatible 1.36 (0.49) 9.67 (1.89)
After incompatible 7.51 (1.09) 4.04 (1.32)
 After loss After compatible 2.44 (0.39) 7.67 (1.00)
After incompatible 7.68 (1.00) 3.78 (0.51)
Experiment 3
 Nonreward After compatible 2.20 (0.53) 7.97 (0.85)
After incompatible 6.48 (0.83) 3.70 (0.62)
 Reward After compatible 4.35 (0.82) 9.35 (1.03)
After incompatible 7.22 (1.03) 5.71 (1.13)
 After nonreward After compatible 2.20 (0.53) 7.97 (0.85)
After incompatible 6.48 (0.83) 3.70 (0.62)
 After gain After compatible 2.39 (0.63) 8.50 (1.31)
After incompatible 6.32 (1.00) 2.57 (0.62)
 After loss After compatible 1.33 (0.42) 8.14 (1.12)
After incompatible 7.76 (0.94) 3.63 (0.61)
Table 2  Results of ANOVAs on response times (RT) and percentage 
errors (PE) in Experiment 1
Bold indicates statistically significant effects at alpha = 0.05
Factors df MSE F p ηp2
Reward anticipation: RT
 Trial Type (TT) 1,47 2003.94 7.71 0.008 0.141
 Previous Compatibility 
(PC)
1,47 502.29 14.65 < 0.001 0.238
 Current Compatibility 
(CC)
1,47 544.67 79.35 < 0.001 0.628
 TT × PC 1,47 202.42 1.30 0.261 0.027
 TT × CC 1,47 349.18 11.86 0.001 0.201
 PC × CC 1,47 386.28 25.67 < 0.001 0.353
 TT × PC × CC 1,47 480.14 < 1 0.987 < 0.001
Reward anticipation: PE
 TT 1,47 6.32 1.92 0.173 0.039
 PC 1,47 4.83 < 1 0.386 0.016
 CC 1,47 6.05 12.32 0.001 0.208
 TT × PC 1,47 3.89 2.41 0.127 0.049
 TT × CC 1,47 5.66 2.20 0.145 0.045
 PC × CC 1,47 4.91 3.95 0.053 0.078
 TT × PC × CC 1,47 4.77 < 1 0.947 < 0.001
Reward aftereffect: RT
 Previous Trial Type 
(PTT)
1,47 981.84 21.11 < 0.001 0.310
 PC 1,47 395.80 24.49 < 0.001 0.343
 CC 1,47 690.89 83.87 < 0.001 0.641
 PTT × PC 1,47 320.57 < 1 0.844 0.001
 PTT × CC 1,47 273.58 3.63 0.063 0.072
 PC × CC 1,47 393.82 21.35 < 0.001 0.312
 PTT × PC × CC 1,47 416.09 < 1 0.688 0.003
Reward aftereffect: PE
 PTT 1,47 5.08 < 1 0.657 0.004
 PC 1,47 6.27 5.46 0.024 0.104
 CC 1,47 7.23 7.10 0.011 0.131
 PTT × PC 1,47 4.50 < 1 0.685 0.004
 PTT × CC 1,47 4.37 5.71 0.021 0.108
 PC × CC 1,47 5.53 < 1 0.386 0.016
 PTT × PC × CC 1,47 5.34 1.17 0.286 0.024
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The role of reward aftereffect
To examine the aftereffect of reward, the present analysis 
examined RT and PE for nonreward trials that followed 
a reward trial and those that followed a nonreward trial. 
They were submitted to 2 (Previous Trial Type: reward vs. 
 nonreward) × 2 (Previous Compatibility: after compatible vs. 
after incompatible) × 2 (Current Compatibility: compatible 
vs. incompatible) ANOVAs. All factors were within-subject 
variables. The results are summarized in Table 2.
For RT (see Fig. 2B), the significant main effect of Previ-
ous Trial Type indicated that responses were faster on trials 
that followed compatible trials (M = 485 ms) than on trials 
that followed incompatible trials (M = 495 ms). The signifi-
cant main effect of Current Compatibility also indicated that 
responses were faster for compatible trials (M = 478 ms) 
than for incompatible trials (M = 503 ms), yielding 25 ms 
of the flanker effect. Although statistically marginal, the 
flanker effect was somewhat larger after nonreward trials 
(M = 27 ms) than after reward trials (M = 21 ms).
For PE, the significant main effects of Previous Compat-
ibility and of Current Compatibility showed, respectively, 
that responses were more accurate after compatible trials 
(M = 1.84%) than after incompatible trials (M = 2.44%) and 
that responses were more accurate for compatible trials 
(M = 1.77%) than for incompatible trials (M = 2.50%), yield-
ing 0.73% of the flanker effect. The interaction between Cur-
rent Compatibility and Previous Trial Type indicated that the 
flanker effect was larger after nonreward trials (M = 1.24%) 
than after reward trials (M = 0.22%). No other effects were 
significant.
Discussion
The present experiment disentangled the roles of anticipa-
tion and aftereffect of performance-contingent rewards in 
the flanker task. Precuing a reward trial facilitated response 
speed and reduced the flanker effect, as compared to when a 
reward trial was not precued (which meant that a nonreward 
trial followed). Rewards facilitated RT for incompatible tri-
als more than RT for compatible trials (19-ms facilitation for 
incompatible vs. 6-ms facilitation for compatible). It may be 
noteworthy that Wühr & Kunde, (2008) presented a precue 
indicating forthcoming stimulus–response compatibility in 
the Simon task, by which one would expect stronger proac-
tive control, and found a larger effect of precue on com-
patible trials than on incompatible trials, which increased 
the Simon effect instead of reducing it. This finding implies 
that people may be able to take advantage of precued S–R 
compatibility more than precued S–R incompatibility, 
whereas the present finding implies that the anticipation of 
performance-contingent rewards reduced distraction from 
the flankers, which is consistent with the previous find-
ing that reward enhanced the goal maintenance (Hefer & 
Dreisbach, 2017). The flanker effect was also reduced after 
reward trials (although this was significant in PE and only 
marginal in RT). These results may reflect a carry-over effect 
of increased proactive control because of a reward precue.
Nevertheless, there was little evidence that either of these 
effects interacted with the effect of compatibility on the pre-
ceding trial. Although the flanker effect depended on the pre-
ceding compatibility, neither the anticipation nor aftereffect 
of reward affected the sequential modulation. The influence 
of performance-contingent reward on the sequential modu-
lation of the flanker effect was reported in a previous study 
(Braem et al., 2012), but the present results did not replicate 
the finding. However, the result are consistent with the dual-
process theory that suggests that performance-contingent 
reward affects proactive control, not reactive control, which 
is also supported at least in part by recent studies (Fröber & 
Dreisbach, 2016; Hefer & Dreisbach, 2017), although it is 
not possible to point out whether the sequential modulation 
truly reflects reactive control in the present experiment.
Overall, the results of the present experiment suggested 
that anticipating performance-contingent rewards increased 
proactive control, reducing the flanker effect on reward trials 
and, to some extent, on trials that followed a reward trial. A 
caution has to be exercised, however, because the timing of 
a reward trial was slightly different from that of a nonreward 
trial, having an additional 750-ms precue display preceding 
the target. Thus, it is possible that the flanker effect was 
smaller on reward trails only because there was an extra 
time to prepare responding to the target by increasing the 
readiness on these trials. In addition, it may be a mere pres-
entation of a salient precue, rather than the reward itself, that 
led to the difference in the flanker effect between reward and 
nonreward trials. If any of these factors accounted for the 
present outcomes, the same results should be replicated even 
when rewards are not contingent on performance, which was 
examined in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, rewards were provided randomly in one-
third of the trials. The procedure was identical with that of 
Experiment 1 in other respects. On these reward trials, par-
ticipants could gain or lose a point that represented monetary 
rewards paid at the end of the session, regardless of whether 
they responded correctly. Reward trials were precued in the 
same manner as in Experiment 1, and participants gained 
a point in two-third of the reward trials and lost a point in 
one-third of the reward trials. Although reward trials were 
precued, reward outcomes (gain or loss) were determined 
randomly without a precue, so they were unpredictable. As 
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reward outcomes were independent of performance out-
comes, there was no incentive to exert stronger proactive 
control even when a reward trial was precued. If the out-
comes of Experiment 1 were merely due to the timing dif-
ferences between reward and nonreward trials, the present 
experiment should replicate the same results; that is, the 
flanker effect should be smaller on reward trials than nonre-
ward trials, as well as on trials that followed a reward trial 
than on those that followed a nonreward trial.
Alternatively, the previous studies would suggest that 
random rewards act as positive valence cues (Fröber & 
Dreisbach, 2014), which then should counteract the conflict 
signal from the ACC (van Steenbergen et al., 2009). If this 
is the case, random rewards would reduce the influence of 
the preceding compatibility on the flanker effect on trials 
that follow a reward gain, as compared to trials that follow 
a loss or no reward. Furthermore, to our knowledge, there 
has not been any study that examined the role of antici-
pating a random reward on proactive control and reactive 
control. While the previous studies showed that random 
rewards would affect reactive control (e.g., van Steenber-
gen et al., 2009), they did not examine whether the prospect 
of a random reward is sufficient to affect reactive control. 
As gains were given in two-third of reward trials and were 
predominant, participants could anticipate a positive reward 
when a reward trial was precued in the present experiment. 
Participants may associate the precue with a positive out-
come, which then serves as an anticipatory valence cue. 
This should counteract the conflict signal from the preced-
ing incompatible trial and reduce the sequential modulation 
of the flanker effect on reward trials. Such an outcome would 
suggest an anticipatory effect of non-contingent reward on 
reactive control.
Method
Participants
A new group of 48 participants were recruited from the 
same subject pool as in Experiment 1 (35 females; mean 
age = 20.44, SD = 3.27), with the same recruitment criteria.
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure
The apparatus and stimuli were the same as those in Experi-
ment 1, and the procedure followed that of Experiment 1. A 
major modification was that gain and loss of rewards were 
provided randomly, irrespective of the response accuracy. 
After the first practice block that consisted of nonreward tri-
als only, participants were informed that they would be pre-
sented with a treasure box on some of the trials, indicating a 
chance to gain a reward. They were also told that the reward 
would be given randomly and that it was nothing to do with 
their performance. Two-thirds of reward trials resulted in 
a gain, and one-third resulted in a loss. Participants were 
not informed of the proportions of gain and loss trials. The 
procedure followed Experiment 1 in other respects.
Results
Trials were filtered in the same manner as Experiment 
1(1.05% of all trials for no response or RT < 150 ms; 7.93% 
for trials after error). RT and PE were computed and ana-
lyzed to examine the roles of anticipation and aftereffect of 
random rewards separately. RT is shown in Fig. 3, and PE is 
summarized in Table 1.
The role of reward anticipation
To examine the role of anticipating a random reward, 
RT and PE were submitted to 2 (Trial Type: reward vs. 
 nonreward) × 2 (Previous Compatibility: after compatible 
vs. after incompatible) × 2 (Current Compatibility: compat-
ible vs. incompatible) ANOVAs. Note that the analysis did 
not distinguish between gain and loss trials, because the 
reward precue only indicated that there was a potential of a 
reward, but not whether it was a gain or loss. As in Experi-
ment 1, nonreward trials that followed a reward trial were 
not included in the present analysis. The results of ANOVAs 
are summarized in Table 3.
For RT (see Fig. 3A), the significant main effect of Cur-
rent Compatibility indicated that responses were faster for 
compatible trials (M = 453 ms) than for incompatible trials 
(M = 475 ms), yielding a 22-ms flanker effect. This effect 
depended on Previous Compatibility, such that the flanker 
effect was 42 ms after compatible trials, but was reduced to 
1 ms after incompatible trials. Importantly, these sequential 
modulations depended on Trial Type. When a reward trial 
was precued, there was a smaller sequential modulation of 
the flanker effect (M = 28 ms) than when it was a nonreward 
trial (M = 53 ms). This outcome implies that a prospect of a 
random reward was sufficient to reduce the sequential modu-
lation of the flanker effect. Although only marginal, the main 
effect of Trial Type showed a tendency that responses are 
faster when a reward trial was precued (M = 461 ms) than 
when a nonreward trial was precued (M = 468 ms).
For PE, the significant main effect of Current Com-
patibility showed that responses were more accurate for 
compatible trials (M = 6.84%) than for incompatible trials 
(M = 7.75%), yielding a 0.91% flanker effect. This effect 
interacted with Previous Compatibility, showing that the 
flanker effect was 3.89% after compatible trials, but it was 
reversed to − 2.07% after incompatible trials. The main 
effect of Trial Type indicated that responses were more 
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accurate when a nonreward trial was precued (M = 5.39%) 
than when a reward trial was precued (M = 9.20%), and 
the significant three-way interaction among Trial Type, 
Previous Compatibility, and Current Compatibility sug-
gested that the sequential modulation of the flanker effect 
was smaller when a reward trial was precued (M = 2.78%) 
than when it was not (M = 9.13%).
The role of reward aftereffect
To examine the role of reward aftereffect, RT and PE for 
nonreward trials were submitted to 3 (Previous Trial Type: 
gain vs. loss vs. nonreward) × 2 (Previous Compatibility: 
after compatible vs. after incompatible) × 2 (Current Com-
patibility: compatible vs. incompatible) ANOVAs. Table 3 
summarizes the results.
For RT (see Fig. 3B), the main effect of Current Compati-
bility showed that responses were faster for compatible trials 
Fig. 3  Mean response times 
(RT) as a function of Previous 
Compatibility (after compatible 
vs. after incompatible) and Cur-
rent Compatibility (compatible 
vs. incompatible) in Experiment 
2. A The role of anticipation. B 
The role of reward aftereffect
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(M = 452 ms) than for incompatible trials (M = 474 ms), 
yielding a 22-ms flanker effect. Its interaction with Previ-
ous Compatibility indicated that the flanker effect was larger 
after compatible trials (M = 41 ms) than after incompatible 
trials (M = 2 ms). This reduction of the flanker effect after 
incompatible trials was 24 ms after a gain, 39 ms after a loss, 
and 53 ms after a nonreward trial, although the three-way 
interaction among Trial Type, Current Compatibility, and 
Previous Compatibility was only marginal.
For PE, the main effect of Current Compatibility showed 
that responses were more accurate for compatible trials 
(M = 4.75%) than for incompatible trials (M = 5.97%), yield-
ing 1.22% of the flanker effect. This effect interacted with 
Previous Compatibility; the flanker effect was 6.16% after 
compatible trials, and it reversed to − 3.71% after incompat-
ible trials. No other effects were significant.
Discussion
The present experiment used the same procedure as in 
Experiment 1, except for the way rewards were provided, but 
the results differed markedly from those of Experiment 1. 
There was little influence of rewards on the overall response 
speed or flanker effect. This outcome is important methodo-
logically, because it implies that the results of Experiment 
1 were not due to the additional precue period that length-
ened the intertrial interval of reward trials as compared to 
that of nonreward trials (see the General Discussion for fur-
ther considerations of this issue). Hence, the present results 
corroborate the conclusion that the anticipation of perfor-
mance-contingent rewards enhanced the response speed and 
reduced the flanker effect on reward trials in Experiment 1, 
but the anticipation of non-contingent rewards did not in 
Experiment 2. We also note that the overall error rate was 
lower in Experiment 1 (2.03%) than in the present experi-
ment (6.33%). This may reflect the incentive for better per-
formance in the former experiment, which was not present 
with random rewards in the latter.
In the meantime, the present results also showed that 
the reductions of the flanker effect after incompatible trials 
were smaller on reward trials than on nonreward trials. Such 
reductions were not observed in Experiment 1. Given that 
this occurred before the rewards were actually presented to 
participants, the outcomes represent an anticipatory effect 
of non-contingent rewards. Within the dual-process theory 
(Braver, 2012), this result can be interpreted that the pros-
pect of a random reward served as a positive valence cue that 
counteracted the conflict signal from the preceding incom-
patible trial. The theory suggests that the ACC detects a con-
flict on incompatible trials and signals the PFC to increase 
cognitive control. Positive rewards can counteract this con-
flict signal, which then reduces reactive control, resulting 
in smaller reductions of the flanker effect when rewards are 
precued. Although only marginally significant, there were 
also some reductions of the sequential modulation after gain 
trials, as compared to those obtained after loss or nonreward 
trials. These outcomes are consistent with the previous study 
using non-contingent rewards in the flanker task (van Steen-
bergen et al., 2009). Interestingly, a loss trial did not lead 
to an increase of the sequential modulation as compared to 
nonreward trials. This may be because the conflict signal 
already had a maximum strength, so the addition of a nega-
tive event could not amplify the signal further.
The current finding of the anticipatory effect of non-
contingent rewards on the sequential modulation of the 
Table 3  Results of ANOVAs on response times (RT) and percentage 
errors (PE) in Experiment 2
Bold indicates statistically significant effects at alpha = 0.05
Factors df MSE F p ηp2
Reward anticipation: RT
 Trial Type (TT) 1,47 1355.91 3.70 0.061 0.073
 Previous Compatibility 
(PC)
1,47 596.27 1.53 0.223 0.031
 Current Compatibility 
(CC)
1,47 1381.87 32.86 < 0.001 0.411
 TT × PC 1,47 546.16 3.15 0.083 0.063
 TT × CC 1,47 676.11 < 1 0.632 0.005
 PC × CC 1,47 1667.69 24.09 < 0.001 0.339
 TT × PC × CC 1,47 637.34 5.94 0.019 0.112
Reward anticipation: PE
 TT 1,47 249.62 5.59 0.022 0.106
 PC 1,47 9.23 1.85 0.180 0.038
 CC 1,47 15.48 5.15 0.028 0.099
 TT × PC 1,47 11.61 < 1 0.463 0.012
 TT × CC 1,47 11.58 < 1 0.483 0.011
 PC × CC 1,47 54.17 15.70 < 0.001 0.250
 TT × PC × CC 1,47 28.05 8.64 0.005 0.155
Reward aftereffect: RT
 Previous Trial Type (PTT) 2,94 1517.33 2.44 0.093 0.049
 PC 1,47 1186.93 3.45 0.070 0.068
 CC 1,47 2318.31 29.71 < 0.001 0.387
 PTT × PC 2,94 1026.30 1.92 0.153 0.039
 PTT × CC 2,94 941.39 < 1 0.803 0.005
 PC × CC 1,47 3413.34 15.90 < 0.001 0.253
 PTT × PC × CC 2,94 905.91 2.83 0.064 0.057
Reward aftereffect: PE
 PTT 2,94 35.43 < 1 0.616 0.010
 PC 1,47 23.34 < 1 0.471 0.011
 CC 1,47 27.04 7.95 0.007 0.145
 PTT × PC 2,94 25.06 < 1 0.768 0.006
 PTT × CC 2,94 31.11 1.66 0.195 0.034
 PC × CC 1,47 74.79 46.88 < 0.001 0.499
 PTT × PC × CC 2,94 23.72 1.43 0.246 0.029
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flanker effect is new, and it supports the distinct roles of 
performance-contingent rewards in Experiment 1 and non-
contingent rewards in the present experiment. We further 
followed up this anticipatory effect of non-contingent 
rewards in the next experiment. It was presumed that the 
reduction of the sequential modulation resulted from the 
predominant proportion of gain trials, which led partici-
pants to anticipate a positive reward outcome when a pre-
cue is provided. Experiment 3 reversed the proportions of 
gain and loss trials, so that participants should now antici-
pate negative outcomes more than positive ones when a 
reward trial is precued. We tested whether the anticipation 
of negative outcomes would have the same impact on cog-
nitive control as that of anticipating positive outcomes.
Experiment 3
The present experiment examined whether the anticipatory 
effect of non-contingent rewards depended on the propor-
tion of gains and losses. In Experiment 3, two-thirds of 
reward trials resulted in a loss, and the remaining one-third 
resulted in a gain; thus, participants would anticipate more 
negative outcomes when reward trials were precued. If the 
results of Experiment 2 were due to anticipation of any 
non-contingent event, regardless of whether it is positive 
or negative, then the sequential modulation of the flanker 
effect should also be reduced when reward trials were pre-
cued in the present experiment, as compared to when they 
were not. From the view of the dual-process theory, the 
anticipation of negative events could amplify the aversive 
signal from conflict and increase reactive control. This 
could result in a greater modulation of the flanker effect 
after an incompatible trial. Nevertheless, Experiment 2 
has also shown that loss trials did not lead to a greater 
modulation of the flanker effect, as compared to nonreward 
trials, suggesting that the additional aversive event did not 
facilitate reactive control. Therefore, the anticipation of 
non-contingent rewards may not influence the sequential 
modulation of the flanker effect when negative outcomes 
are predominant.
Method
Participants
Forty eight participants were newly recruited from the 
same subject pool as in Experiments 1 and 2 (29 females; 
mean age = 20.98, SD = 4.53), with the same recruitment 
criteria.
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure
Experiment 3 was identical with Experiment 2, except that 
the proportions of gain and loss trials were modified. Two-
thirds of all reward trials resulted in a loss, and one-third 
resulted in a gain. Participants were instructed on the task 
in the same manner as in Experiment 2, and they were not 
informed of the proportions of losses and gains. Although all 
sessions necessarily ended with a negative overall score, as 
there were more loss trials, the score was inverted to a posi-
tive score after the session, so that all participants received 
additional compensations equivalent to those for partici-
pants in Experiment 2. Participants were not informed of 
this inversion until they completed the session.
Results
Trials were filtered in the same manner as in the preced-
ing experiments (0.68% of all trials for no response or 
RT < 150 ms; 6.72% for trials after error). RT and PE were 
analyzed in the same manner as in Experiment 2. RT is 
shown in Fig. 4, and PE is summarized in Table 1.
The role of reward anticipation
RT and PE were submitted to 2 (Trial Type: reward vs. 
 nonreward) × 2 (Previous Compatibility: after compatible vs. 
after incompatible) × 2 (Current Compatibility: compatible 
vs. incompatible) ANOVAs, and the results are summarized 
in Table 4.
For RT (see Fig. 4A), the main effect of Current Compat-
ibility indicated that responses were faster for compatible tri-
als (M = 452 ms) than for incompatible trials (M = 478 ms), 
yielding a 25-ms flanker effect. The significant main effect 
of Previous Compatibility also indicated that responses were 
also faster after compatible trials (M = 463 ms) than after 
incompatible trials (M = 467 ms). These two factors inter-
acted, showing that the flanker effect was 53 ms after com-
patible trials, and it was reduced to − 1 ms after incompat-
ible trials. The significant main effect of Trial Type revealed 
that responses were faster when a reward trial was precued 
(M = 461 ms) than when it was not (M = 469 ms). The flanker 
effect was 22 ms when a reward trial was precued, and it was 
30 ms when there was no precue, which was reflected in a 
marginally significant interaction between Trial Type and 
Current Compatibility. No other effects were significant.
For PE, the significant main effect of Current Compat-
ibility indicated that responses were more accurate for 
compatible trials (M = 5.06%) than for incompatible trials 
(M = 6.68%), yielding a 1.62% flanker effect. This effect 
interacted with Previous Compatibility; the flanker effect 
was larger after compatible trials (M = 5.39%) than after 
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incompatible trials (M = − 2.14%). The main effect of Trial 
Type indicated that responses were also more accurate 
when a nonreward trial was precued (M = 5.09%) than when 
a reward trial was precued (M = 6.66%). No other effects 
reached significance.
The role of reward aftereffect
RT and PE for nonreward trials were submitted to 3 (Previ-
ous Trial Type: gain vs. loss vs. nonreward) × 2 (Previous 
Compatibility: after compatible vs. after incompatible) × 2 
(Current Compatibility: compatible vs. incompatible) ANO-
VAs, and Table 4 summarizes the results.
For RT (see Fig. 4B), the main effect of Current Compat-
ibility indicated that responses were faster for compatible tri-
als (M = 469 ms) than for incompatible trials (M = 497 ms), 
yielding a 28-ms flanker effect, and its interaction with 
Previous Compatibility indicated that the flanker effect was 
larger after compatible trials (M = 58 ms) than after incom-
patible trials (M = − 3 ms). The main effect of the Previous 
Trial Type indicated that responses were fastest when the 
previous trial was a nonreward trial (M = 469 ms), interme-
diate when it was a gain (M = 487 ms), and slowest when it 
was a loss (M = 493 ms). No other effects were significant.
For PE, the main effect of Current Compat-
ibility indicated that responses were more accurate for 
Fig. 4  Mean response times 
(RT) as a function of Previous 
Compatibility (after compatible 
vs. after incompatible) and Cur-
rent Compatibility (compatible 
vs. incompatible) in Experiment 
3. A The role of reward antici-
pation. B The role of reward 
aftereffect
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compatible trials (M = 4.41%) than for incompatible trials 
(M = 5.75%), yielding a 1.34% flanker effect, and its inter-
action with Previous Compatibility showed that the flanker 
effect was larger after compatible trials (M = 6.23%) than 
after incompatible trials (M = − 3.55%). No other effects 
were significant. The overall error rate was (M = 5.47%), 
similar to Experiment 2, but still lower than Experiment 
1; as suggested earlier, the lower error rate in Experiment 
1 likely reflected the performance-contingent incentives.
Discussion
The present experiment examined whether the anticipa-
tory effect of non-contingent rewards depended on the 
proportions of reward outcomes. In contrast to the results 
of Experiment 2, which showed that the anticipation of 
non-contingent rewards reduced the sequential modula-
tion of the flanker effect when gains were predominant, 
the present results revealed little influence on the sequen-
tial modulation when loss trials were predominant. These 
results support the conclusion that the anticipation of a 
positive outcome drives the influence of non-contingent 
rewards, not just a possibility of any non-contingent event. 
Again, these results also indicated that any anticipatory 
effects observed in the preceding experiments were not 
explained by the timing of the stimulus events alone (i.e., 
the additional 750 ms for the reward precue on reward 
trials), because the only difference between Experiment 2 
and Experiment 3 was the proportion of gains and losses. 
Therefore, the contents of the events that followed the 
reward precues did matter.
Two outcomes of the experiment were not predicted a 
priori, so they require some speculations. The first unex-
pected outcome was that the anticipation of a reward trial 
facilitated response speed and reduced the flanker effect. 
These observations were similar to those obtained with 
performance-contingent rewards in Experiment 1, and 
they indicated that stronger proactive control was exerted 
when a reward trial was precued. An anecdotal explanation 
of these findings would be that some participants desper-
ately tried to figure out why they were being punished 
and attempted to perform the task better to avoid losses, 
despite the fact that they had been informed that reward 
was determined randomly. These participants might have 
exercised stronger proactive control on a reward trial. The 
present results also suggested that responses were par-
ticularly slowed after a loss trial, which was not observed 
when gain trials were predominant in Experiment 2. Such 
slowing might have occurred if participants tried to figure 
out an explanation for the loss after the trial. Our specu-
lation of guessing about random events may be akin to 
recent findings that cognitive control increased when 
participants guessed upcoming tasks that were generated 
randomly but not when they ‘chose’ upcoming tasks that 
might be accepted or denied (Kleinsorge & Scheil, 2016, 
2018).
The second unexpected outcome was that there was lit-
tle influence on the sequential modulation of the flanker 
effect after a gain trial. If a gain served as a momentary 
positive valence cue that counteracted the conflict signal, 
the sequential modulation should have been reduced after 
a gain (van Steenbergen et al., 2015). A possible reason for 
Table 4  Results of ANOVAs on response times (RT) and percentage 
errors (PE) in Experiment 3
Bold indicates statistically significant effects at alpha = 0.05
Factors df MSE F p ηp2
Reward anticipation: RT
 Trial Type (TT) 1,47 1268.20 4.76 0.034 0.092
 Previous Compatibility 
(PC)
1,47 352.12 5.31 0.026 0.102
 Current Compatibility 
(CC)
1,47 812.40 80.17 < 0.001 0.630
 TT × PC 1,47 517.08 < 1 0.626 0.005
 TT × CC 1,47 448.22 3.78 0.058 0.074
 PC × CC 1,47 863.59 83.53 < 0.001 0.640
 TT × PC × CC 1,47 464.74 < 1 0.397 0.015
Reward anticipation: PE
 TT 1,47 32.54 7.29 0.010 0.134
 PC 1,47 17.70 < 1 0.652 0.004
 CC 1,47 18.86 13.41 0.001 0.222
 TT × PC 1,47 17.44 < 1 0.649 0.004
 TT × CC 1,47 13.54 < 1 0.740 0.002
 PC × CC 1,47 22.57 60.29 < 0.001 0.562
 TT × PC × CC 1,47 13.83 1.81 0.185 0.037
Reward aftereffect: RT
 Previous Trial Type 
(PTT)
2,94 1678.06 17.65 < 0.001 0.273
 PC 1,47 1271.05 3.03 0.088 0.061
 CC 1,47 2156.39 50.73 < 0.001 0.519
 PTT × PC 2,94 813.91 < 1 0.776 0.005
 PTT × CC 2,94 830.18 < 1 0.707 0.007
 PC × CC 1,47 1588.16 87.00 < 0.001 0.649
 PTT × PC × CC 2,94 973.05 < 1 0.624 0.010
Reward aftereffect: PE
 PTT 2,94 22.17 < 1 0.855 0.003
 PC 1,47 24.48 < 1 0.973 < 0.001
 CC 1,47 29.25 8.85 0.005 0.158
 PTT × PC 2,94 21.33 2.17 0.120 0.044
 PTT × CC 2,94 15.98 < 1 0.929 0.002
 PC × CC 1,47 54.87 62.81 < 0.001 0.572
 PTT × PC × CC 2,94 21.33 < 1 0.452 0.017
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not having observed a reduction of the sequential modu-
lation in the present experiment is that negative moods 
had developed when participants experienced more losses, 
and these negative moods might have overridden and sup-
pressed the influence of gains; that is, participants were no 
longer pleased with momentary gains, as they were always 
losing overall. In a previous study, the sequential modula-
tion has been shown to depend not only on reward-related 
factors, but also on the moods of participants (van Steen-
bergen et al., 2010). With the predominance of losses in 
the present experiment, many participants expressed frus-
tration during debriefing at the end of the session. Thus, 
participants were in negative moods while performing the 
task, so a momentary positive valence cue might not have 
been as effective as when participants were in positive or 
neutral moods. This would explain the lack of influence of 
positive reward on the sequential modulation of the flanker 
effect.
Despite these unexpected (but reasonable in retrospect) 
outcomes, the present experiment supported the claim that 
the anticipatory effect of non-contingent reward on the 
sequential modulation of the flanker effect depended on the 
predominance of the outcomes. Therefore, the findings in 
Experiment 2 are not due to extraneous factors (e.g., the 
timing of the stimulus presentations) other than the reward 
anticipation and aftereffect. The results indicated that there 
are differential influences of performance-contingent and 
non-contingent rewards on proactive and reactive controls.
General discussion
A popular neurocognitive theory of cognitive control dis-
tinguishes proactive and reactive controls as the sources of 
behavior regulation (e.g., Botvinick, 2007; Braver, 2012). 
This dual-process theory is well grounded in behavioral 
and cognitive neuroscience evidences, and there is a grow-
ing interest as to how these cognitive operations interplay 
with motivational and emotional factors (e.g., Botvinick & 
Braver, 2010; Braem et al., 2012; Fröber & Dreisbach, 2016; 
Hadland et al., 2003; Stürmer et al., 2011; van Steenbergen 
et al., 2010). The present study aimed at distinguishing the 
roles of anticipation and aftereffect of two forms of reward 
presentation in proactive and reactive controls. In the three 
experiments, the contingency of reward on task performance 
was manipulated. In Experiment 1, reward was contingent 
on task performance, where participants gained a reward 
when they performed the task correctly, but they lost it when 
they made an error. Precuing a reward trial facilitated the 
overall response speed and decreased the flanker effect, 
which suggests an increase in proactive control, consistent 
with the previous findings that incentives enhance atten-
tional control and reduce conflict (Engelmann et al., 2009; 
Padmala & Pessoa, 2011). On the other hand, Experiment 1 
offered little evidence that performance-contingent rewards 
influenced the sequential modulation of the flanker effect. 
This outcome contradicts a previous study that reported 
an increased sequential modulation after a performance-
contingent reward was provided (Braem et al., 2012), but 
it is consistent with recent studies using the AX-CPT that 
suggested that performance-contingent rewards increased 
proactive control but had little influence on reactive control 
(Fröber & Dreisbach, 2014; Hefer & Dreisbach, 2017).
With non-contingent rewards, the anticipation of a posi-
tive reward was shown to reduce the sequential modulation 
of the flanker effect in Experiment 2, but the anticipation of 
a negative reward had little impact on the sequential modu-
lation in Experiment 3. The previous studies have shown 
that there were smaller sequential modulations of the flanker 
effect after a non-contingent reward was acquired (van 
Steenbergen et al., 2009, 2012), which is consistent with 
the results of Experiment 2. However, these studies have not 
separated the anticipatory effect of non-contingent rewards 
from their aftereffects. Because the three experiments of the 
present study used the same procedure except for the con-
tingency of rewards, the discrepancies of the results point to 
the influence of the contingency, not other peripheral factors 
such as timing of trial events that were slightly different 
between reward and nonreward trials. Instead, the present 
findings provide a novel conclusion that, based on the dual-
process theory, the prospect of a non-contingent reward is 
sufficient to modulate reactive control.
According to the dual-process theory, reactive control 
depends on aversive conflict signals from the ACC to the 
PFC, and a positive valence cue can cancel out the aversive 
signals, resulting in a reduction of the sequential modula-
tion of the flanker effect. Within this framework, the present 
results imply that anticipation of a positive reward serves as 
a positive valence cue and is sufficient to cancel the aversive 
signal. A previous study also has shown that the sequential 
modulation is reduced under positive moods (van Steenber-
gen et al., 2010), which suggests a sustained effect of posi-
tive affect. As the present study varied positive and negative 
rewards across trials in a random fashion and the effects of 
rewards were examined by comparing trials within the same 
block, the findings reflected transient effects of non-contin-
gent rewards on reactive control. Thus, together with van 
Steenbergen et al.’s finding, the present study add that there 
are both sustained and transient effects of non-contingent 
rewards on reactive control, which can be contrasted to the 
previous findings that there are both sustained and transient 
effects of performance-contingent rewards on proactive con-
trol (e.g., Chiew & Braver, 2013; Engelmann et al., 2009; 
Locke & Braver, 2008).
Interestingly, there was little influence of anticipating 
negative rewards on reactive control. When losses were 
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predominant, the transient effect of positive rewards was 
also absent. A possible reason for this outcome is that the 
anticipation of negative rewards led to negative moods, 
which thus produced a sustained effect of negative rewards 
and suppressed the transient effect of positive rewards. It is 
equally possible that the influence of reward aftereffect is 
contingent on the anticipation of rewards, such that positive 
rewards can affect proactive or reactive control only when 
positive rewards have been anticipated prior to the reward 
outcome (cf. Notebaert & Braem, 2015). It may be the con-
sistency between expected and actual outcomes, not mere 
positive valence cue that counteracted the conflict signal 
on incompatible trials and decreased reactive control on the 
following trial. This possibility needs to be scrutinized in 
future investigations.
A possible limitation of the present study was men-
tioned in Experiment 1 and addressed in Experiments 2 
and 3, which was that any differences between reward and 
nonreward trials in the current procedure could reflect the 
timing differences between the two types of trial. Through-
out the three experiments, a reward trial was preceded by a 
reward cue that appeared for 750 ms, which did not appear 
on a  nonreward trial. In a study that used a Stroop-like 
task involving a categorization of facial stimuli into male 
or female that were accompanied by the word MALE or 
FEMALE, the sequential modulation of the Stroop-like 
effect decreased as the intertrial interval (ITI) increased 
(Egner, Ely, & Grinband, 2010). If this time course of the 
sequential modulation is responsible solely for the present 
findings, one would have to speculate that the lack of the 
influence of performance-contingent reward in Experiment 
1 reflected a decay of the sequential modulation, whereas 
the presence of the influence of performance non-contingent 
reward in Experiment 2 reflected a facilitation. Furthermore, 
the lack of the influence of performance non-contingent 
reward in Experiment 3 should also reflect a decay, that is, 
in the opposite direction to that obtained in Experiment 2. 
Consequently, the time course of the sequential modulation 
should have depended on the contingency of reward on per-
formance as well as the predominance of gains or losses 
of performance non-contingent reward. This alternative 
interpretation is highly speculative and opportunistic, and 
we also note that it only differs from our conclusion as to 
whether reward affects reactive control indirectly via inter-
trial interval or directly via anticipation of reward. Moreover, 
the alternative account does not have much to say about why 
proactive control also reduced when performance-contingent 
reward was precued (Egner et al. did not report any effect 
of ITI on overall RT or Stroop-like effect), which leaves us 
flat as to how it explains the present results. Nevertheless, 
our conclusion that the performance contingency and the 
predominance of performance non-contingent reward gains 
play important roles in cognitive control still remains intact 
even if the ITI effect depends on the type of reward and the 
predominance of gain/loss. Considering the fact that there 
are several possible mechanisms that could give rise to the 
sequential modulation (Botvinick et al., 2010; Duthoo et al., 
2014; Hommel et al., 2004), one cannot conclude based on 
the present results how the two forms of reward presentation 
influence reactive control, but it seems safe to conclude that 
performance-contingent rewards influence proactive control, 
whereas non-contingent rewards influence reactive control 
directly or indirectly.
The conclusion is generally consistent with the previous 
findings using the AX-CPT (Fröber & Dreisbach, 2014; 
Hefer & Dreisbach, 2017). The results further suggest that 
the anticipation of rewards plays an important role in both 
forms of reward presentation, although they are expressed 
differently. It would be interesting to examine in future stud-
ies as to whether anticipation is a prerequisite to observe 
modulations of proactive and reactive control in the two 
forms of reward presentation. Researchers have suggested 
that rewards have both motivational and affective compo-
nents (Berridge & Robinson, 2003), and these components 
may have different influences on cognitive control (Chiew & 
Braver, 2011). Another study by Braem et al. (2013) found 
in a task-switching situation that performance-contingent 
presentation of positive valenced pictures influenced task-
switching cost differently from performance non-contingent 
presentation of positive valenced pictures, consistent with 
the present findings. It has further been suggested that the 
affective component of reward depends on the actual deliv-
ery of a reward (Notebaert & Braem, 2015), but the present 
study indicates that anticipation of a reward is sufficient for 
the affective component to modulate reactive control with-
out actual delivery. It is to be seen whether anticipation is 
also sufficient for purely affective cues, such as pleasant vs. 
unpleasant pictures, to influence cognitive control (e.g., Dre-
isbach & Goschke, 2004; Kuhl & Kazén, 1999; Phillips, 
Bull, Adams, & Fraser, 2002; Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 
2007; Van der Stigchel, Imants, & Ridderinkhof, 2011). Pro-
vided that the influences of affective stimuli or moods on 
cognitive processes still remain unclear in other domains as 
well (e.g., Bruyneel et al., 2013), such investigations would 
provide better understanding of the important interplay 
between cognitive control and affective and motivational 
processes.
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